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I am pleased to see that Frey now accepts this
fundamental moral claim. He acknowledges that
suffering is suffering, whether the being is
autonomous or not. He also joins me in rejecting
species ism - the view that the wrongness of
inflicting pain - or, for that matter, of taking a life
- varies according to the species of a being,
considered in itself and not merely as a pointer to
other qualities or characteristics that the being is
likely to have.
In tum, I certainly agree with Frey that the value
of a life may differ according to the nature of the
being living that life. Together with my colleague
Helga Kuhse, I have written a book arguing for the
view that the significance of killing a human being
can vary according to the capacities of that being)
So far as the comparative value of human and
nonhuman life is concerned, my critical fire has been
directed against those who hold that aU human lives
are more valuable than any nonhuman lives. This is
the traditional doctrine of the "sanctity of human
life," widely held by those who object to any form of
abortion or euthanasia. I reject it because it is
obvious that in respect of any morally significant
characteristics, such as autonomy, rationality, self
awareness, capacity to have long-term future
preferences, ability to use language, or whatever,
some humans rank well below many nonhuman
animals. I am thinking here, of course, of infants and

I am probably the wrong person to reply to Frey's
paper. Although we certainly have our differences on
issues such as the ethics of eating meat, on this
particular topic we are in agreement on a range of
the most important matters. This is because Frey's
paper is an attack on the claim that it is as wrong to
take the life of a nonhuman animal as it is to take
the life of a human being; whereas the position I
take in Animal Liberation, which leads me to my
views on vegetarianism, animal experimentation,
and other issues concerning the treatment of
animals, is based on the argument that it is wrong to
give less consideration to the suffering of an animal
than we would give to the similar suffering of a
human being)
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a view? Frey has pointed out that when, in Practical
Ethics, I listed some animals which may have such a
self-concept, the only significant food· animal I
included was the pig. 3 But the list was not intended
to be exhaustive, and one might well include cattle
as well. I claim no special expenise on this matter.
Certainly, however, I am prepared to grant that some
food animals are probably not capable of seeing
themselves as having a future - it would be difficult
to argue that fish have this capacity, and only a little
less difficult to argue that chickens have it.

severely retarded humans - the so-called "marginal
cases." Frey is not vulnerable to the argument from
marginal cases because he does not take the view
that these non-autonomous humans have a life
which is more valuable than the lives of similar non
autonomous animals. He says, for instance, that if it
is permissible to use animals as sources for spare parts
to be transplanted to autonomous human beings who
would otherwise die, it must also be permissible to
use, as sources for spare parts, human beings at a
similar mental level to the animals. Thus, Frey's
position is not speciesist.

Even if we did decide that only pigs, among all
the food animals, might qualify for having the
necessary self-concept, we should still beware of the
inference Frey appears to make when he suggests
that this can relieve our worries about the use we
make of, and the treatment we mete out to,
animals. 4 For, as I have already said, my case against
eating meat is based not on the deaths of the
animals but on their lives. That is why, in Animal
Liberation, I devoted a long chapter to farming
practices, detailing especially the confinement of
animals in modern factory farms, but recounting
also the many cruelties involved in traditional
farming methods. Perhaps a few of us living in rural
areas could ensure that we eat only animals without
desires for the future, who have led pleasant lives
free from the exploitation which appears to be
inherent in any commercial system of farming. But
for us city folk, forced to rely on the supermarket
for our food, there is no such possibility. That is
why, if we consider the sufferings of animals and do
not discount this suffering because those who suffer
are not human beings, we should be vegetarians.
This conclusion stands irrespective of any
arguments about the value of animal life and the
wrongness of killing animals.
0

Then do Frey and I differ at all? We do, because
although we may roughly agree on which human lives
are more valuable than the lives of other humans or
of some nonhuman animals, we do not agree on
what makes these lives more valuable. Frey sees the
key as being autonomy - the strong form of
autonomy he refers to by the expression "autonomy
as control." On the other hand, I see the crucial
factor as being the capacity to understand that one
has a future, and to have desires or preferences for
that future.
Normally a being who is autonomous in Frey's
sense will also have the capacity to have preferences
for the future; hence the practical equivalence of our
views. But in order to test the difference between
them, let us try to imagine someone who lacks
autonomy in Frey's sense but does have preferences
for the future. Consider a person who completely
lacks autonomy and simply watches his/her life go
by, much as we view a movie. Just as we are
powerless to control what happens in the movie, so
this person is powerless to control the direction of
his/her life; yet just as we may have very strong
preferences about what will happen to the characters
in the movie, so this person may have very strong
preferences about what will happen to him/her. Is it
worse to kill such a person - contrary to his/her
strong preference for continued life - than it would
be to kill a being who has no conception of a future
at all? I think it would be, and if I am right, one
plausible explanation would be that it is not the
presence of autonomy, nor the capacity to control
one's own life, which makes killing especially wrong
but the thwarting of preferences which takes place
when those with desires for the future are killed
despite their desires for future life or for goals which
can only be achieved by future life.
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On my view, then, it is especially wrong to kill
beings who can grasp the fact that they exist over
time and may have a future. What follows from such

4Animal Liberation, Chapter 3.

203

Between the Species

